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We prove the existence and uniqueness of a stationary monetary equilibrium in
a Bewley-Aiyagari model with idiosyncratic shocks. This is an exchange economy
with an infinite horizon and one consumption good, and with each agent facing
idiosyncratic endowment shocks at each period; the agents may trade their endow-
ments for the only asset, fiat money. The government increases the money supply
at a constant growth rate that induces inflation in a stationary monetary equilib-
rium. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition for a stationary monetary
equilibrium (where money has a positive value and the aggregate real balance is
constant over time) to exist, and, when it exists, we show that it is unique. The ar-
gument for uniqueness is based on a new monotonicity result for the average optimal
consumption.
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1 Introduction
The Bewley-Aiyagari model (Bewley [4], Aiyagari [3], and Hugget [9]) has become the
standard environment to study heterogenous agents and endogenous distribution of asset
holdings of various kinds. One use of such models is to study the welfare cost of infla-
tion (see, for example, Imrohoroglu [11]), and this is typically done within the class of
stationary equilibrium with a constant real balance. It has been demonstrated (Green
and Zhou [7] and Wallace [24]) that the distributional aspect of monetary policy in these
models is essential in determination of the optimal inflation rate. However, this endoge-
nous distribution of money holdings also causes difficulty in deriving equilibrium existence
and uniqueness. While equilibrium existence has been established, there are no general
theoretical results for uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium in this type of model.1
In this paper we prove equilibrium existence and uniqueness in a pure currency econ-
omy under the Bewley-Aiyagari environment. In this model, there is a single perishable
consumption good and a population of infinitely lived agents who face idiosyncratic en-
dowment shocks at each period but may trade their endowments for money. The govern-
ment increases the money supply at a constant growth rate in a lump-sum manner. We
focus on stationary equilibria. In contrast to similar models in which the (rental) price of
capital is determined by current aggregate capital holdings, in our economy the price of
money also depends on its future prices and hence can only be determined endogenously.
An equilibrium is monetary if money is valued in equilibrium. Stationarity requires two
endogenous variables to be constant over time: first, the total real value of money (and,
hence, when money supply grows at a positive rate, there is inflation); second, the distri-
bution of money holdings. We give the necessary and sufficient condition for a monetary
equilibrium to exist. More importantly, we show that when it exists, it is also unique.
In this environment, an agent’s optimal money holding depends on his endowment
1As discussed in Miao [20] (comments after Definition 17.1.1), in the Bewley-Aiyagari model with
capital accumulation, multiple equilibria cannot be excluded in general.
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shock and his previous money holding, and hence follows a first-order Markov process.
Under a constant money supply, equilibrium is determined by the unique invariant distri-
bution of this Markov process. When money supply grows, however, the real value of the
lump-sum transfer is also an equilibrium object, and market clearing gives an equilibrium
condition that relates the average consumption under the equilibrium distribution and the
real transfer. Uniqueness of equilibrium would follow if the average consumption is mono-
tonic in the real transfer. The standard technique is to show that optimal consumption
increases with the real transfer in the individual dynamic programming problem, which
does not hold in general, however. Instead, we develop a new technique that directly
demonstrates that average consumption increases with the real transfer. Our arguments
rely on the ergodic theorem, which relates the long-run average of consumptions from an
“typical” individual realization of endowment shocks to the average consumption of the
stationary cross-section distribution of consumption. While similar existence results have
been established in earlier papers, our uniqueness result is new.
Our uniqueness result implies real determinacy among stationary monetary equilibria.
This is in contrast with the indeterminacy result in Green and Zhou [6], which finds
a continuum of stationary monetary equilibria in the context of a Kiyotaki-Wright [13]
model but with divisible money holdings and indivisible goods, and under double auctions.
Moreover, since the unique equilibrium is upper hemi-continuous in inflation rate, the
equilibrium allocation is also continuous. This implies that an optimal inflation rate
exists, and the literature has provided examples in which such a rate is strictly positive,
such as Green and Zhou [7].2 In contrast with the Lagos-Wright [16] model, in which the
unique stationary monetary equilibrium features a degenerate distribution and inflation
through lump-sum transfers is never optimal, in our model a monetary equilibrium always
features a non-degenerate distribution and inflation can be optimal.3
2Other examples in closely related models include Rocheteau, Weill, and Wong [21] based on variants
of the Lagos-Wright [16] model, and Lippi, Ragni and Trachter [19] based on the Scheinkman-Weiss [22]
model.
3See Gu and Wright [8] for a uniqueness result in the context of the Lagos-Wright model.
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More broadly speaking, our paper contributes to a recent literature on the existence
and uniqueness of equilibria in Bewley-Aiyagari models. Açikg̈oz [2] proves the existence
of a stationary equilibrium in such a model with capital accumulation, but, in contrast to
our pure-currency economy, he also demonstrates that there can be multiple stationary
equilibria. As pointed out there, one reason for this multiplicity is the income effects of a
higher rate-of-returns on assets, and Lehrer and Light [17] give a sufficient condition on
the underlying utility function for the substitution effect to dominate the income effect;
Light [18] uses that condition to obtain uniqueness.
Finally, our uniqueness result allows for unambiguous comparative statics, and one
can apply existing comparative-statics results to our setup. In particular, although our
setup is not a special case of that considered in Acemoglu and Jensen [1], we can readily
translate their results in our setup. For example, given their results, it is easy to show
that an increase in the discount factor will lead to an increase in the equilibrium real
balances in our setup.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and there is an infinite horizon. There is a population of agents who are
ex ante identical and there is one perishable good. Let u(c) be the agent’s utility from
consuming c ≥ 0 units of the good. We assume that u : R+ → [0, ū], where u(0) = 0 is
bounded, strictly increasing and strictly concave.4 Agents maximize discounted expected
utility with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). At the beginning of each period each agent receives
an idiosyncratic shock to his endowment, denoted by y. We assume that y is drawn from
a closed interval Y = [y, y] with 0 ≤ y < y and is i.i.d. across periods from distribution
π ∈ ∆(Y ) such that y, y ∈ support(π). Agents cannot commit to future actions and there
4We assume the utility function to be bounded to avoid technical issue with the dynamic programming
problem. See discussion in Section 4 for more details.
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is no record-keeping technology for credit arrangements. There is an intrinsically useless
asset called money, and in each period agents may trade their money holdings against the
consumption good in a competitive market.
We assume that the government increases the money supply at a constant net growth
rate γ ≥ 0; thus, if Mt is the initial average money holding at period t, then
Mt = (1 + γ)Mt−1 for each t = 1, 2, ...,
and this increase in money supply is achieved with a lump-sum transfer: in the end of
each period t = 0, 1, 2, ..., each agent receives γMt units of money from the government.
It is convenient to normalize the agent’s money holdings as fractions of the average
money holding. With this normalization, the above scheme of increasing money supply
at rate γ ≥ 0 with a lump-sum transfer is equivalent to the following scheme with a
proportional taxation on money holdings and with a lump-sum transfer: an agent who
holds m units of money before the transfer will end up with (m+γ)/(1+γ) = (1−τ)m+τ
units after the transfer, where τ = γ/(1 + γ). We call τ the tax rate on money holding.
Thus, the course of action in each period has three stages: first, agents receive their
endowments; second, agents trade between their endowments and money; finally, the
tax on money holding and transfer occurs. Note also that under this normalization the
average money holding is one for all periods.
Fix a sequence p0, p1, p2, · · · ∈ R+ of prices of money in terms of goods. Consider a
single agent who maximizes expected discounted utility assuming the price of money in
terms of goods at every period t is pt. The agent’s problem is a dynamic optimization
problem with state variable (m, y) representing money holding and endowment before
the trade. Let Vt(m, y) be the optimal continuation value under state (m, y) at period t.
5
Compressing the dependence on p0, p1, . . . , the Bellman Equation for Vt is given by




Vt+1 ((1− τ)m′ + τ, y′) π(dy′) : 0 ≤ c,m′, c+m′pt ≤ y +mpt
}
(1)
for every t ≥ 0. Here the choice variables c and m′ are the consumption and post-trade
money holding. We use ct(m, y) and φt(m, y) to denote the optimal consumption and
post-trade monetary holding that correspond to the sequence p0, p1, . . . of prices.





librium with a tax rate on money holding τ is a sequence p0, p1, . . . of prices of money in




of distributions of money holdings
with
∫
m µt(dm) = 1 for all t ≥ 0, such that the following holds for every t ≥ 0:5
1. Law of motion: µt+1(A) = µt ⊗ π ({(m, y) : (1− τ)φt(m, y) + τ) ∈ A}) for every
Borel subset A of R.
2. Market clearing:
∫
ct(m, y) µ(dm) π(dy) =
∫
y π(dy).
The equilibrium is monetary if pt > 0 for every t ≥ 0.
The law of motion reflects the fact that if the distribution of money holdings at the
beginning of period t is µt and agents trade optimally then the distribution of money
holdings at the beginning of period t+ 1 is given by µt+1. The market-clearing conditions
express the clearing of the market for the consumption good at each period. By Warlas’
Law there is a sequence of equivalent conditions in terms of money holdings.
It is easy to verify that there is a nonmonetary equilibrium under which pt = 0 for all
t ≥ 0. In this equilibrium money has no value and all agents consume their endowments
at each period. In contrast, we are interested in a monetary equilibrium under which
money has a positive value.
5We use µt⊗π to denote the joint distribution of money holdings and endowments under independence
of the two.
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While our setup is closely related to that in Acemoglu and Jensen [1], there are two
differences. First, in their setup each agent solves a dynamic programming problem
that depends on some parameter (that corresponds to pt in our model), which, under
market clearing, is determined by an exogenous function of the aggregation of individual
choices. In contrast, the sequence {pt}∞t=0 in our setup is endogenous and the market
clearing conditions relate the aggregation of individual choice to the aggregation of the
endowments. Second, our interest in monetary equilibrium has no counterpart in their
environment. For these reasons we cannot directly use their results in our setup. In
particular, the question for which initial distribution of money holdings µ0 there exists
some monetary equilibrium is an open question in our setup.
Remark 1. The conditions in Definitions 1 can be interpreted in two ways: from the
perspective of a single agent, and from the perspective of the population. Consider first a
single agent whose initial money holding is randomized from µ0, who receives a stochastic
stream of shocks, and who consumes and saves according to ct and φt. The time series of
consumption and money holding of the agent is then a stochastic process. The market-
clearing conditions imply that µt is the distribution of money holding at day t and that the
expectation of period t’s consumption equals the expected endowment. At the population
level, the dynamic is completely deterministic: µt is the empirical distribution of money
holdings at the beginning of period t and µt ⊗ π is the empirical joint distribution of
money holdings and endowments. More explicitly, we can identify the set of agent with
R+ × [y, y]N equipped with a measure µ0 ⊗ π⊗N, so that each agent is identified with
his initial money holding and the infinite sequence of endowments. From this population
perspective, the market-clearing conditions say that the population consumes the total
endowment. This dual perspective is a basic feature of the Bewley-Aiyagari models. We
use the stochastic single-agent perspective to derive the optimal consumption and saving
strategy of the agents, and we use the deterministic population perspective to describe
7
what will actually happen.6
We focus on the stationary monetary equilibrium defined below.
Definition 2. An equilibrium with a tax rate on money holding τ is stationary if p = p0 =
p1 = . . . and µ = µ0 = µ1 = . . . for some p ∈ R+ and µ ∈ ∆(R+) with
∫
m µ(dm) = 1.
The stationary equilibrium is monetary if p > 0.
In a stationary monetary equilibrium with tax rate τ , the price for money is constant
over time. However, remember that this is because we normalized the average money
supply to one unit per agent, and hence, the price for money before the normalization
(the version where the money supply increases at rate γ per period) decreases at a constant
rate. This then implies that there is a constant inflation at rate γ and the (gross) rate-
of-return on money is 1− τ .
Note that under a stationary equilibrium the stochastic process that represents the
consumption and saving of a single agent (as mentioned in Remark 1) is stationary. By the
ergodic theorem, the expectation of consumption at each period also equals the average
long-run realized consumption. Therefore, under a stationary equilibrium, the realized
(across-period) average consumption of the agent equals the mean endowment.
Now we are ready to present our main result.
Theorem 1. There exists a stationary monetary equilibrium if and only if
u′(y) < β(1− τ) ·
∫
u′(y) π(dy). (2)
When it exists, it is also unique and the invariant distribution µ of money holding is
non-degenerated.
Theorem 1 gives a precise condition for a monetary equilibrium to exist, (2), and when
it does, it shows that it is also unique. This condition essentially gives an upper bound
6Readers who would like us to embed the two perspectives in a single model, with stochastic pro-
cesses for each agent and appeal to some “exact law of large numbers” in order to justify “no aggregate
uncertainty” are referred to Section II.B in Acemoglu and Jensen [1] and the references therein.
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on the inflation rate (note that 1/(1− τ) = 1 + γ). When the utility function u satisfies
the Inada condition that u′(0) = ∞ (such as the typically used CRRA utility functions)
and when π gives sufficiently high probability to arbitrary small endowments, this upper
bound becomes infinite. Otherwise, this upper bound increases when the discount factor
becomes larger and when π decreases in the standard stochastic order.
The condition (2) is derived from the following exercise: given that the (gross) rate
of return on money is 1 − τ and that there is no government transfer, would an agent
with the highest endowment, ȳ, and with no money at hand, save any positive amount of
money? We use the Euler equation to show that the answer is yes if and only if condition
(2) holds (see Claim 3 in the proof section). As a result, when the condition (2) fails,
monotonicity of the saving function implies that no agent would save (see Claim 4 in
the proof section), and hence the only stationary equilibrium is nonmonetary and the
equilibrium allocation is autarky. In contrast, when the condition (2) holds, we show
that a monetary equilibrium exists. This existence part of Theorem 1, though apparently
new, follows from standard arguments.7 Our main contribution is to show that such an
equilibrium is unique.
Uniqueness allows for an unambiguous comparative statics, and one may directly
apply some known results. In particular, although our setup is not a special case of
that considered in Acemoglu and Jensen [1], it is easy to show that an increase in any
“positive shocks” defined there (i.e., any changes in exogenous parameters that will lead
to an increase in the policy function φ) will lead to an increase in the equilibrium real
balances in our setup. One such shock is an increase in the discount factor β. However, an
increase in the endowment (in the first-order-stochastic-dominance sense) is not a positive
shock in general, as it has two opposing effects to the optimal money holding: while it
gives more resources to save today, it also gives a better future so that there is less need
7Geanakoplos et al. [5] also give an existence result in a closely related economy with inflation.
However, because a cash-in-advance constraint is assumed there, there is no need for any condition
analogous to (2).
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to save today (the income effect).
3 Proof of Theorem 1
After some mathematical preliminaries (Section 3.1), we first write the Bellman equation
for the single-agent problem and the definition of stationary equilibrium in terms of real
values (Proposition 3 in Section 3.2). With this formulation, the state space represents
the real wealth of the agent at every period after the endowment shock.
The argument for proving existence is standard. Since, for each individual agent,
the optimal real balances across periods follow a Markov process, we show that this
process satisfies the mixing condition in Stokey and Lucas [23] and hence has a unique
ergodic distribution. When τ = 0, that ergodic distribution fully describes the unique
stationary monetary equilibrium. When τ > 0, however, a fixed-point argument is needed
to establish the existence, because the single-agent problem depends on the real value
of the monetary lump-sum transfer, denoted by b = pτ , which in turn depends on the
equilibrium price of money, p. To prove uniqueness of the fixed point when τ > 0, we need
some sort of monotonicity with respect to b. The core of our argument is that, while the
individual policy function may not be monotonic, we can show that the average optimal
consumption is increasing in b. We give this monotonicity result in Section 3.3, where we
study the individual dynamic programming problem. Finally, we use the monotonicity
result to prove Theorem 1 in Section 3.4.
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 Notations
If µ, ν ∈ ∆(R) are probability distributions and f : R → R, we denote by f(µ) ∈ ∆(R)
the push-forward of µ under f . This is the distribution of f(X), where X is a random
variable with distribution µ. In the special case that f(x) = ax + b, we also denote
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f(µ) = aµ + b. We denote by µ ∗ ν the convolution of µ and ν. This is the distribution
of X + Y , where X, Y are independent random variables with distributions X and Y .
Monotone markov chains
This section reviews known results about monotone Markov processes that will be used
in the proof. Let (W,W) be a Borel space. A transition probability over W is a function
χ : W ×W → [0, 1] such that χ(w, ·) is a probability distribution over (W,W) for every
w ∈ W and χ(·, A) is a Borel function for every A ∈ W . We let T : ∆(W ) → ∆(W ) be
the stochastic operator of χ given by T (λ)(A) =
∫
χ(w,A)λ(dw) for every A ∈ W .
Fix a transition probability χ over (W,W). For every λ ∈ ∆(W ), we denote by Pλ
the distribution of a sequence X0, X1, . . . of W -valued random variables such that
X0 ∼ λ, and
Pλ(Xk+1 ∈ ·|X0, . . . , Xk) = χ(Xk, ·) for every k ≥ 0.
(3)
When λ = δw is the Dirac measure over w ∈ W , we also denote Pλ = Pw. A probability
distribution λ over W is called an invariant distribution of χ if Tλ = λ. Equivalently λ
is an invariant distribution if the stochastic process X0, X1, . . . given in (3) is stationary.
For every B ∈ W , let TB be the (possibly infinite) first time in which the process hits B:
TB = inf{1 ≤ t : Xt ∈ B}.
The invariant distribution λ is ergodic if P(TB < ∞) = 1 for every B ∈ W such that
λ(B) > 0. The fundamental feature of ergodic distributions, captured by the Ergodic
Theorem [20, Theorem 4.3.2], is that the expected value of a function f : W → R of
the state of the process at any given time almost surely equals the time average of the
function of the sample path of the process.
For our argument we use the following lemma (Kac’s Lemma, c.f. Krengel [14], Propo-
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sition 6.8): The expectation of a function f of the state in any given time equals the
expected average of the function between two entries to a set B. The lemma follows
immediately from the ergodic theorem, but in fact it follows from more basic principles.
Lemma 1. Let χ be a transition probability over (W,W), and let λ be an ergodic invariant
distribution. Let f : W → R be Borel measurable and bounded. Then for every B ∈ W









where X0, X1, . . . are the W -valued random variables given by (3).
The transition probability χ is uniquely ergodic if it admits a unique invariant distri-
bution λ. If χ is a uniquely ergodic transition probability, then its invariant distribution
is ergodic.
We assume from now on that W = [w,w] ⊆ Rn is an n-dimensional interval, equipped
with the standard compact lattice structure. The transition probability χ is monotone if
χ(w, ·) ≤st χ(w′, ·) whenever w ≤ w′. Equivalently, χ is monotone if the corresponding
stochastic operator T : ∆(W )→ ∆(W ) is monotone in first-order stochastic dominance.
We present two propositions, Propositions 1 and 2, which are taken from Stokey and
Lucas [23].8
Proposition 1. Every monotone transition probability admits an invariant distribution.
Proposition 2. Let χ be a monotone transition probability. If there exists some w ∈ Rn
such that w < w < w and such that
Pw (Xk < w for some k ≥ 0) > 0, and Pw (Xk > w for some k ≥ 0) > 0, (4)
8The existence result in Stokey and Lucas [23] for Proposition 1 requires Feller property, which, as
noted by Hopenhayn and Prescott [10], is not necessary. The assertion about the support in Proposition 2
is not stated in Stokey and Lucas [23], but it follows immediately from the proof.
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then χ is uniquely ergodic. Moreover, if (4) holds for every such w, then w,w are in the
support of the invariant distribution of χ.
3.2 Stationary equilibrium in real terms
The definition of stationary equilibrium (Definition 2) is based on a parametrized single
agent problem, where the state (m, y) is money holding and current endowment and the
price of money p is a parameter. For our proof, it is convenient to rewrite the agent’s
problem in real terms, with state space R+ representing the real wealth w = pm+y of the
agent at every period (after the endowment shock and before the trade), and parameter
space R+ representing real government transfer b. The parameter b would correspond
to the lump-sum transfer component, τ , in the original Bellman equation (1), but here
it represents the real value of such transfer and its equilibrium value depends on the
equilibrium value of money.















By standard dynamic programming arguments it follows from the assumptions on u that
the supremum is achieved at a unique consumption level. We denote by cb(w) the optimal
consumption and sb(w) = w−cb(w) the optimal real balance holding at the end of a period.
Consider a stationary monetary equilibrium (µ, p) with distribution of money holding
µ and price of money p. Under this equilibrium the real government transfer b and the
distribution of real wealth λ are given by
b = τp, λ = pµ ∗ π. (6)
The following proposition characterizes stationary equilibrium in terms of the two real
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objects, b and λ.
Proposition 3. For a fixed effective tax rate on money τ , a pair (µ, p) constitutes a




and a number b ≥ 0 for which (6) holds and which satisfy the following conditions:
1. Invariance: λ = (1− τ)sb(λ) ∗ π + b.
2. Government balance: b = τ
∫
sb dλ.
3. Positive real balances:
∫
sb dλ > 0.
The first condition corresponds to the invariance condition in Definition 2, and it says
that the distribution of real wealth is constant. In the second condition, the left side is the
real value of the lump-sum monetary transfer to agents, and the right side is the inflation
tax (in real terms) the government collects through money creation. The last condition
corresponds to the requirement for a monetary equilibrium in Definition 1, that is, p > 0.
The conditions in Proposition 3 are written in a way that highlights the additional
difficulty that is involved in proving uniqueness when τ > 0. Indeed, for τ = 0 the
government-balance condition implies that b = 0. In this case, as we shall see, the
existence and uniqueness of a stationary monetary equilibrium follows immediately from
the existence and uniqueness of the invariant distribution of the Markov transition induced
by the random endowment and the agent’s optimal saving. For τ > 0 we need to find the
pair b and λ that satisfies the invariance condition and the government-balance condition
simultaneously. This requires an appeal to some fixed-point argument (which is easy,
because b is a one-dimensional entity). Uniqueness requires some monotonicity result,
which is the main theoretical contribution of this paper.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that (λ, b) satisfies the three listed conditions. Let
p =
∫
sb dλ and µ = ((1− τ)sb(λ) + b) /p. (7)
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First we show that (λ, b) satisfies (6) for (p, µ). By invariance of λ (condition 1 in Propo-
sition 3) and by (7),
λ = (1− τ)sb(λ) ∗ π + b = pµ ∗ π.
Moreover, there is also an one-for-one translation between the policy functions induced
by (1) and by (5): pφ(m, y) = sb(pm + y). Thus, invariance of λ also implies invariance
of µ:
pµ ∗ π = λ and hence sb(pµ ∗ π) = sb(λ).
The other direction is immediate.
3.3 The individual consumption-saving problem
In this subsection we study the single agent’s problem (5). By standard dynamic program-
ming arguments, it follows from the assumptions on u that Vb is bounded, continuous,
monotone increasing, and strictly concave in w, and that Vb is submodular in (b, w); that
the supremum is achieved at a unique consumption level and that the optimal consump-
tion cb(w) is continuous, increasing in b, strictly increasing in w, and limw→∞ cb(w) =∞;
that the optimal saving sb(w) = w− cb(w) is decreasing in b and strictly increasing in w;
that Euler’s equation
u′(cb(w)) ≥ β(1− τ)
∫
u′(cb[(1− τ)sb(w) + y + b]) π(dy) (8)
is satisfied, with equality if cb(w) < w; and that cb(·) is the unique function that satisfies
Euler’s equation (8) and the transversality condition.
Let
ηb(w, y) = (1− τ)sb(w) + y + b (9)
be the next-period wealth of an agent who has wealth w at the current period, and gets the
lump-sum transfer b and endowment shock y next period. The following claim summarizes
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properties of the next-period wealth function.
Claim 1. Let ηb(w, y) be the next period wealth function given by (9). Then ηb(w, y)
is continuous in b, w, y, monotone increasing in w and y, and ηb(w, y) − w is strictly
decreasing in w and increasing in y. Moreover, ηb(w, ȳ) − w < 0 for a sufficiently large
w.
Proof. The first assertion follows from (9) and the corresponding properties of the optimal
saving function. The second assertion follows from ηb(w, y)−w = −cb(w)− τsb(w)+y+ b
and monotonicity of the optimal consumption and saving functions. The last assertion
follows from the fact that limw→∞ cb(w) =∞.
Invariant distribution
By Claim 1, there exists a unique wb ∈ R+ such that ηb(wb, y) = wb; let wb = b + y
so that ηb(wb, y) = wb since cb(b + y) = b + y from the Euler’s equation. Consider the
transition probability χb on W = [wb, wb] such that χb(·|w) = ηb(w, π). The corresponding
stochastic operator is given by
Tb(λ) = (1− τ)sb(λ) ∗ π + b. (10)
Then it follows from Claim 1 and the definition of wb, wb that χb is a monotone transition
on [wb, wb]. The following claim and its proof are standard.
Claim 2. For every b ≥ 0, the transition χb is uniquely ergodic. Moreover, if λb is the
invariant distribution then wb, wb ∈ support(λb).
Proof. Using Proposition 2 we need to show that (4) holds for every w such that wb <
w < wb. Indeed, let y < y be sufficiently small such that ηb(w, y) < w, with existence
following from the definition of wb and Claim 1. Then it follows from Claim 1 that
ηb(w
′, z) < w whenever w′ < w and y ≤ z ≤ y, and that ηb(w′, z) < w′ whenever w′ ≥ w
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and y ≤ z ≤ y. These properties and the continuity of η imply that there exists some N
such that, for every sequence, z1, . . . , zN , of endowments such that zi ∈ [y, y], receiving
these endowments in consecutive periods will decrease the agent’s wealth to below w,
regardless of the initial wealth. Since there is a positive probability that the endowment
of the agent at a given period is in [y, y], the first condition of Proposition 2 is indeed
satisfied. The second condition is proved analogously.
Monotonicity
Although in general the function b 7→ (1−τ)sb(w)+b is not monotonic in b and hence the
transition χb is not monotonic in b (w.r.t. first-order-stochastic-dominance), the following
lemma, which is the core of our proof, says that the average consumption is indeed
monotonic in b.
Lemma 2. Let λb be the unique ergodic distribution given by Claim 2. The function
b 7→
∫
cb dλb is continuous and strictly increasing in b.
Note that by the Ergodic Theorem
∫
cb dλb is the long-run average of individual
consumption. Lemma 2 is very intuitive: the average consumption of an agent increases
if the agent receives a larger transfer every period. However, the lemma is not obvious
since the agent’s strategy maximizes discounted utility instead of average consumption.
Standard arguments for proving comparative statics on the invariant distribution of a
Markov transition with respect to a change in a parameter require that the transition be
monotonic in the parameter. Such changes are called positive shocks in Acemoglu and
Jensen [1] and underline all the comparative-statics results in their paper and, to our
knowledge, all other known similar results. In our setup, however, increasing b is not a
positive shock—the problem is that χb(w) is not increasing in b in sense of first-order
stochastic dominance.
Here is a rough intuition for the proof: Consider two agents, one facing a transfer b
and another b′ with b < b′. We call the former agent Low and the latter High. We couple
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Figure 1: Coupled wealth process
the stochastic processes of consumption and saving of High and Low by assuming they
receive the same daily endowment. Consider a typical realization of wealth for these two
agents, as depicted in Figure 1. Each period in which High starts with higher wealth than
Low, it follows from properties of the optimal consumption that High consumes more
than that of Low, as would be the case for the periods within period 0 to period T1 in
the above figure. Consider the interval from period T1 + 1 to period T2, an interval of
consecutive periods at the beginning of which High’s wealth is lower than Low. Then
during these periods High paid less taxes than Low, and received the same endowment
and higher transfer in each period. Moreover, if we count the interval from period T1,
then High entered this sequence with more wealth than Low and finished it with less
wealth. It then follows that in all these periods taken together High consumed more than
Low. Therefore, in the long-run High consumes more than Low on every realization. By
the Ergodic Theorem, the long run average consumption on each realization equals the
expected consumption of the agents at each period. Therefore, the expected consumption
of High is higher than that of Low. This is the basic idea of the proof with two caveats:
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first, we need to be more careful with what happens in the endpoints of the sequence of
days in which High has lower wealth than Low; second, the ergodic theorem delivers the
right intuition but it is overkill. In fact, we only need the more basic Kac’s Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. Continuity of the next period wealth function (b, w, y) 7→ ηb in b, w
implies that the function (b, w) 7→ χb(·|w) is continuous in the weak∗ topology. By
Theorem 12.13 in Stokey and Lucas [23], this implies continuity of the map b 7→ λb.









1, Y1), . . . , (Wt,W
′
t , Yt), . . . ,
of the wealth process of the two agents with the same endowment process Yt, where one
agent, called Low, receives transfer b at every period, and a second, called High, receives
transfer b′. The wealth of the agents at the beginning of period t is Wt and W
′
t . Therefore




t−1, Yt−1). By the same argument as in Claim 2 the
process is ergodic.9 We have to prove that E {cb′(W ′0)} > E {cb(W0)}. By Lemma 1, we











where T = inf{1 ≤ t <∞ : Wt < W ′t}. Note that the event W0 < W ′0 is indeed of positive
probability, which follows from the assertion about the support of λb and λb′ in Claim 2





t)− cb(Wt)) > 0 a.s. (11)
on the event {W0 < W ′0}. Indeed, if T = 1, then the inequality follows from the fact that
9One has to apply the argument in Claim 2 to show that the probability transition over [wb, wb] ×




0 and the monotonicity of cb(w) (both in w and in b). Assume now that T > 1.




from the monotonicity of sb(w) (increasing in w and decreasing in b). In addition, (12)
holds for t = 0 since W1 = (1− τ)sb(W0) + b and W ′1 = (1− τ)sb′(W ′0) + b′, but b < b′ and
W1 ≥ W ′1 since T > 1. Thus,
T−1∑
t=0






Yt + (T − 1)b− sb(WT−1)














where the equalities follow from the aggregation of the households’ consumption and
transfers from the beginning of period 0 until the market on period T − 1 closes, and the
inequality follows from (12) and the fact that W0 < W
′
0, b < b
′. This proves (11).
Remark 2. The same proof can be used to prove a more general property in our setting:
the long-run average consumption in increases when the endowment increases in first-
order stochastic dominance. The only change we need to make in the proof is to couple
endowment shocks of the two agents so that the high agent receives a higher endowment
every period.
3.4 Proof of Theorem 1
The following claims state the implications of condition (2) in Theorem 1 in terms of the
individual agent’s problem: Claim 3 implies that, when the lump-sum transfer is zero,
the agent will save some money after receiving a high endowment, and Claim 4 implies
that in this case the agent will save money under the invariant distribution.
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Claim 3. Condition (2) holds if and only if s0(y) > 0.
Proof. If (2) holds, then it follows from Euler’s equation that the optimal consumption c0
satisfies c0(y) < y so that s0(y) = y − c0(y) > 0 . If (2) does not hold, then the function
c̃0(w) = w for every w ∈ [y, y] satisfies Euler’s equation and the transversality condition
and therefore it is optimal. Therefore, the optimal s0 satisfies s0(y) = y − c0(y) = 0
Claim 4. Condition (2) holds if and only if
∫
s0 dλ0 > 0. (13)
Proof. Note that
∫
s0 dλ0 > 0 if and only if s0(w0) > 0, because w0 is the maximal
element in support(λ0) and s0(·) is monotonic and continuous.
We use Claim 3. If (2) holds, then s0(y) > 0, and therefore η0(y, y) > y which implies
w0 > y by the definition of w0 and Claim 1. Therefore, s0(w0) ≥ s0(y) > 0 by the
monotonicity of s0(w). If (2) does not hold, then s0(y) = 0, and therefore η0(y, y) = y,
which implies w0 = y by definition of w0. Therefore, in this case s0(w0) = s0(y) = 0.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 1. It follows from the argument
in Section 3.3 that λb is the unique distribution that satisfies Condition 1 (invariance) in
Proposition 3 for every b ≥ 0.
We claim that there exists a unique b ≥ 0 such that Condition 2 (government balance)
is satisfied. We consider two cases. First, suppose that τ = 0. Then, clearly b = 0 is such
a unique b. Suppose then that τ > 0. From the invariance of λb, we get that
∫
w λb(dw) = (1− τ) ·
∫



















for every b ≥ 0. Thus, it is sufficient to show that there exists a unique b for which
the right-hand side of the above equation equals zero. The assertion about uniqueness
now follows from Lemma 2 about strict monotonicity of
∫
cb dλb. The existence follows
form the fact that the left-hand side of the equation is non-positive at b = 0 (and is





cb(wb) ≥ wb ≥ b for every w ≥ b.
Finally, we need to prove that Condition 3 in Proposition 3 (positive saving) holds if
and only if (2) holds. Recall that by Claim 4, condition (2) is equivalent to (13). Again
we consider two cases. If τ = 0, then b = 0 and so a positive saving holds iff (13) holds.
Suppose now that τ > 0. To satisfy the government budget balancedness, both (13)
and a positive saving are equivalent to b > 0, and the result follows immediately from
Claim 4. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. Note that we only need the machinery
of Lemma 2 when τ > 0.
4 Concluding Remarks
The main contribution of this paper is to prove uniqueness using the coupling argument:
comparing the mean value of two stationary process by embedding them . In the con-
text of wealth processes of two agents under consumption-saving problems with different
parameters, the coupling is done by assuming the two agents get the same endowment
shocks in every period. We used this argument to establish the monotonicity result in
Lemma 2, and applied this result to establish uniqueness of equilibrium in a pure-currency
economics. In order to focus on the coupling argument, we have simplified all other com-
ponents in the model. Below we discuss our assumptions, and highlight ones that are
technical in natural but can be relaxed.
22
Unbounded utilities and endowments
We assume a bounded utility function to avoid technical issues with the individual dy-
namic programming problem (see Kuhn [15] and references therein for issues regarding
unbounded utility functions). However, our argument for the uniqueness of the stationary
monetary equilibrium does not depend on that, and our results will go through as long as
the Bellman equation has a unique solution. Similarly, we can relax the assumption that
the endowment is drawn from a compact set, but then we need to make distributional
assumptions as in Kamihigashi and Stachurski [12] to ensure the existence and uniqueness
of the invariant distribution for each b.
Markovian endowment process
For our coupling argument to work, the endowment process needs not to be i.i.d., and
a Markovian endowment process or more generally any stationary process would work
just fine, as long as the induced wealth process is uniquely ergodic (see Hopenhayn and
Prescott [10] for sufficient conditions). Under this condition, in order to get existence of
monetary equilibrium we need to modify the condition (2) corresponding to the Euler
equation with respect to the given Makovian process of endowments.
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